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MORAL PRACTICE
IN LATE STOICISM AND BUDDHIST MEDITATION
MICHAEL GOERGER
ABSTRACT: I argue in this essay that Stoic philosophers in the late Greco-Roman period
utilized philosophical exercises and spiritual technologies similar in form to a meditative
exercise currently practiced in Buddhism. I begin with an in-depth discussion of moral
development in the late Stoa, focusing particularly on their theories of cosmopolitanism and
oikeiōsis. These theoretical commitments, I argue, necessitated the adoption of exercises and
practices designed to guide practitioners toward the goal of universal moral concern. Using
insights gained from Buddhist practice, I identify passages in Stoic texts that call for and
prescribe moral exercise. While much work in comparative philosophy compares the content
of diverse philosophical theories, the form that these theories take can also be compared.
Stoic philosophy was viewed as a “way of life” by many ancient philosophers, and thus their
philosophical views share several formal characteristics with Buddhist religious practices.
The primary good realized by this comparison, I conclude, is to outline the ways in which
Greco-Roman philosophies can be enriched by reading these theories in light of the lived,
practical traditions that characterize Buddhist thought.
Keywords: Stoicism, Buddhism, oikeiōsis, moral development, mettā, meditation

1.
In this essay I argue that a limited comparison between Buddhist meditative practices
and Stoic ethics in the Roman period provides insight into Stoic practices aimed at
moral development. Much comparative work in philosophy focuses on using the
theoretical commitments and philosophical concepts employed within Western
traditions to make sense of non-Western traditions. I take a somewhat different tack,
using the moral practices and philosophical technologies of contemporary and
classical Buddhism to deepen our understanding of Greco-Roman Stoicism. Both
schools share a theoretical commitment to universal moral concern and both
developed practices that guide students toward this goal. While direct textual
evidence of Stoic moral practice is rare, practices in Buddhism, I argue, can be used
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to identify and reinterpret passages that describe Stoic moral practices. The end result
of this work is both a better understanding of Greco-Roman Stoicism and a fruitful
method of comparing Hellenistic philosophies with non-Western philosophical
systems.
I begin by arguing in Section 2 that the Stoics viewed philosophy as a way of life,
as a practical task as well as an intellectual enterprise. I then argue in Section 3 that
the Stoics were committed to the development of universal moral concern. This
ethical commitment is shared with both classical and contemporary Buddhism, and in
Section 4 I explore the Buddhist tradition. I examine one meditative practice – mettā
meditation – designed to develop universal love. In Section 5, I return to Stoicism and
argue that the same technique used in mettā meditation, re-identification of the target
individual, is present in several Stoic texts. These passages, I argue, outline actual
exercises practitioners should use to develop moral concern. I conclude in Section 6
with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of my methodology.
2.
In her landmark work The Therapy of Desire, Martha Nussbaum (1994) argues that
Hellenistic moral philosophy is characterized by a medical analogy in which the
practice of philosophy heals the soul just as the practice of medicine heals the body.
That is, just as a medical doctor treats physical illness, philosophers treat
psychological and emotional maladies. The Hellenistic philosophers viewed
philosophy as a discipline or series of disciplines that could be used to treat grief,
anxiety, and other misfortunes (c.f. Hadot 1981; Hadot 1995; Nehamas 2000). In what
follows, I illustrate and defend this position through a close discussion of two
representative passages from late Stoic authors. In both passages, the logic chopping
and “quibbling” of some philosophers is contrasted with a practical engagement with
philosophical truths. The first passage is drawn from Epictetus (55-135 CE); the
second is taken from Seneca (4 BCE-65 CE).
2.1
In Discourse I.4 Epictetus asks how one progresses in philosophy. Epictetus believes
that virtue leads to happiness, serenity, and an untroubled mind, and so he thinks
progress in philosophy must lead to each of these things. As a student of philosophy,
he says, you must discipline yourself so that you will, “neither fail to attain what you
desire nor fall into what you want to avoid; in exerting your impulse to act and not
act, that you may not be liable to error; in assent and the withholding of assent, that
you may not be liable to be deceived (I.4.11).” The goal of intense philosophical
study consists in using the knowledge gained through philosophy to transform one’s
life.
Epictetus draws an extended metaphor between a philosopher and an athlete to
argue that philosophical knowledge must be used to reshape oneself (I.4.13-17). The
athlete’s goal is to build muscle and develop strength in order to become a more
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effective wrestler. Epictetus imagines asking the athlete if he has made progress
toward this goal. The athlete replies by pointing to his weights, showing that he
possess the equipment needed to develop strength. Epictetus thinks that this is a
ridiculous response; he doesn’t want to know if the athlete has acquired the correct
equipment, but if he has used that equipment to develop his abilities. As it stands, few
athletes would mistake the means (the weights) with the end (developing strength) in
this way. The athlete is then compared to a student of philosophy. The student is also
asked to demonstrate her progress. Like the athlete, she points to her books, saying,
“Take the treatise On Impulse [a famous Chrysippian treatise] and see how
thoroughly I have read it (I.4.14).” Epictetus responds, “That is not what I’m looking
for, slave, but how you exercise your impulse to act and not act (I.4.14).” While the
student may have carefully read the treatise, this does not necessarily show that she
has put the treatise into practice and mastered her own impulses. Epictetus believes
that many students of philosophy make this mistake, confusing the goal of philosophy
with the means used to obtain that goal.
Epictetus concludes that you should, “Never look for your work in one place and
your progress in another (I.4.19).” The student engages in intellectual work. She
studies diligently, stays up late into the night, and devotes herself to the mastery of
arguments. Yet, progress lies in her ability to use this knowledge to control her
impulses and transform her desires. This is the material with which she should work.
The student is like an individual who, trying to get fit, collects gym memberships and
exercise equipment not realizing that progress is not found in the equipment but in
using it. She may acquire many ideas and master complicated philosophical theories,
but until she applies these theories to her own life, she will not make progress as a
philosopher.
2.2
Epictetus’ views are echoed by Seneca in a second representative passage. In the 48th
letter to Lucilius, Lucilius asks Seneca for his opinion on a paradox in the philosophy
of friendship. Seneca chides him, saying, “What you have to offer me is nothing but
the distortion of words and splitting of syllables. It is clear that unless I can devise
some very tricky premises and by false deductions tack on to them a fallacy which
springs from the truth, I shall not be able to distinguish between what is desirable and
what is to be avoided (48.5).” And then, “I am ashamed! Old men as we are, dealing
with a problem so serious we make play of it (48.5).” Lucilius’ concerns about
friendship are important, but Seneca finds his attempt at logical analysis unworthy of
philosophical engagement. The purpose of philosophy is not to solve paradoxes, but
to provide guidance and, in the case of the Stoics, to develop one’s faculties of
desiring, choosing, and acting. “Philosophy offers council,” Seneca concludes while
doubting that Lucilius’ style of inquiry will help him live a better life (48.8).
Seneca’s argument is more forceful than that offered by Epictetus. After asking
whether arguments alone will relieve the student’s burdens, he writes, “Would that I
could say that they were merely of no profit! They are positively harmful (48.10).”
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Lucilius is so entangled in arguments, definitions, distinctions, and objections that he
fails to examine his own desires, fears, and aversions and does not work to correct
them. Further, by disconnecting the arguments and distinctions from the life he lives,
Lucilius deprives philosophy of its characteristic value. Ensnared by argument, he
forgets to examine himself.
Other letters contain similar statements which favor philosophical development
through practice as well as study. For example, in the 18th letter Seneca sets out the
following task to help Lucilius control his desire for wealth: “Set aside a certain
number of days, during which you shall be content with the scantiest and cheapest
fare, with coarse and rough dress, saying to yourself all the while: “Is this the
condition I fear?” (18.5).” Self-denial, a frequent prescription in Seneca’s letters,
helps one see that the desire for wealth and the fear of poverty are irrational. Three or
four days of self-imposed poverty are a “test” and “experiment” by which
philosophers “practice our strokes on the “dummy” (18.8).”
The purpose of these exercises is to break the grip of desire and aversion on the
psyche. Lucilius is wealthy, and Seneca does not advise that he dispose of his wealth.
Instead, he hopes that through practice, Lucilius will come to live with his wealth,
“dauntlessly,” which can happen only “by persuading yourself that you can live
happily without it as well as with it…(18.13).” The goal of philosophy is practical, to
discipline one’s desires and aversions, and this practical goal will not be met until one
puts philosophical knowledge into practice in one’s own life. It is one thing to know
that it is irrational to fear poverty, but quite another to no longer fear it.
Both Epictetus and Seneca explicitly claim that Stoic philosophy involves work
(c.f. Sellars 2006). While philosophical knowledge is important to the Stoics—
Epictetus claims that philosophical theories teach us “the things from which serenity
arises and tranquility comes to us (I.4.28)”—one cannot live well without putting this
knowledge into practice. Merely reading the treatise On Impulse or solving a paradox
regarding friendship will not make the theory efficacious in one’s life. Discipline,
practice, and exercise are required if progress is to be made, and study that doesn’t
include such practice is useless. If one desires to obtain the tranquility promised by
Stoic philosophy, one must examine and discipline one’s desires, thoughts, and
actions in light of the arguments and teachings of philosophers. And so one tries to
sleep on a hard bed, to remain sober while the mob is drunk during Saturnalia, to
control one’s emotions when consoling a grieving friend, and to eat simple food when
indulgences are available. In each case one is disciplining oneself, practicing against
the dummy, and doing the work of philosophy.
3.
I now turn to the Stoic view that all individuals, regardless of rank, title, or position,
are members of a common community and owed equal moral concern. This view is
entwined with their support of cosmopolitanism—the ethico-political view that all
individuals are members of one community or polis (Kleingeld & Brown 2013; c.f.
Appiah 2006 and Nussbaum 2002). Seneca writes,
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There are two commonwealths - the one, a vast and truly common state, which embraces
alike gods and men, in which we look neither to this corner of the earth nor to that, but
measure the bounds of our citizenship by the path of the sun; the other, the one to which
we have been assigned by the accident of birth (de Otio 4.1).

Seneca here argues that every individual is bound not only to those who live in the
same physical polis, but to all those who fall under the “path of the sun.” One is
obligated to serve the human community whenever doing so is possible, and when
humanitarian actions of this type are not possible one should serve those nearest to
one (Seneca, de Otio 3.5). Cosmopolitanism thus expands the ethico-political
community (the polis) to include the entirety of the universe (the cosmos). As a result,
some degree of moral concern is owed to all other human beings.
The Stoics termed the process by which individuals develop moral concern for
other rational beings oikeiōsis (Pembroke 1971). The term is difficult to translate. The
root word, the noun oikos, means ‘house’ or ‘household’ and includes those persons
who belong to the household. Annas (1995, 262) suggests translating the word as
“being akin to” or “familiarization,” which suggests both “the notion of family and
that of being close to and coming to belong to.” In the Stoic context, the idea central
to oikeiōsis is that one expands one’s metaphorical household to include those who
are normally excluded from it. It is, “the process by which we recognize our natural
affinity first to ourselves and subsequently to various features of our environment
(Blundell 1990, 221).” The Stoic theory of oikeiōsis is quite complex and a full
discussion is not possible here. Instead, I focus on those aspects of the theory most
germane to my thesis and draw heavily on primary texts. Several lengthy treatments
are available for readers desiring a more complete understanding (c.f. Annas 1995 and
Engberg-Pedersen 1990).
The most complete statement of the Stoic theory of oikeiōsis is found in Book III
of Cicero’s dialogue De Finibus. Cato argues that universal moral concern arises from
considerations about what one has most reason to do. He begins:
Every animal, as soon as it is born (this is where one should start), is concerned with
itself, and takes care to preserve itself. It favors its constitution and whatever preserves
its constitution, whereas it recoils from its destruction and whatever appears to promote
its destruction (de Fin. 3.16).

Cato goes on to claim that concern for self-preservation naturally develops as an
individual grows older. Over time, one begins to view oneself as a rational person.
Thus, what is good for oneself is to act as a rational person would act. Reason
instructs one to pursue virtue which will lead one to one’s own good. The agent thus
begins to engage in virtuous action because it is (instrumentally) good to do so (de
Fin. 3.21). At this stage her moral concern remains egocentrically oriented toward her
own good as a rational person.
At the center of this argument is the observation that individuals naturally care
about that which is viewed as part of or as belonging to oneself. For example, one is
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initially concerned for one’s body because it is one’s own body rather than because it
is a body as such. Quite naturally then, Cato states at 3.62, “we are impelled by nature
itself to love those to whom we have given birth.” Children are a part of their parents
in the biological sense, and it is thus natural for parents to be concerned with the
welfare of their children. However, while parental love is an extension of self-love, it
is other oriented. Parents love their children for their own sake, but love this child
because it is theirs. For Cato, parental love constitutes the first step outside of the
sphere of egotistical concern. Though still rooted in concern for one’s self, the self is
expanded to include the children.1
Concern for unrelated others comes about when the rational agent realizes that,
“the very fact of being human requires that no human being be a stranger to others (de
Fin. 3.63).” In order to support this point, Cato utilizes a familiar metaphor. He says,
Some of our body parts - for example our eyes and ears - are as it were created just for
themselves. Others - for example legs and hands - also enhance the utility of the other
parts […] Yet the ties between human beings are far closer. Hence we are fitted by nature
to form associations, assemblies, and states (de Fin. 3.63).

Like the varied parts of a body, it is in the nature of human beings to come together to
work for the common aims of the common body. This is true of “associations,
assemblies, and states,” as well as the entire human community. Says Cato, “Nature
has given bulls the instinct to defend their calves against lions with immense passion
and force. In the same way, those with great talent and the capacity for achievement
[…] have a natural inclination to help the human race (de Fin. 3.66).” Each of us, in
so far as we are rational, ought to work for the “common advantage and welfare of all
(de Fin. 3.65).” When one has completely developed one’s rational agency, one no
longer views oneself as a single individual among other individuals, but as a part of
the whole human community.
What I have outlined above is the Stoic theory of moral development. This theory
shows us that it is rational to view each individual as a member of a common body
and to respect that individual as such. However, a Stoic like Epictetus or Seneca
would now expect a student to begin to live this way, to actually treat all other
individuals as members of the same body. For the sake of comparison, this is like
demanding that Kantian philosophers live their lives in accordance with the
Categorical Imperative or that Utilitarians live according to the Principle of Utility.
The Stoics thus face a problem. They have a theoretical commitment to universal
moral concern, but need to find practices that will develop this concern in the student.

1

Stoic views of the self provide another interesting point of contact for comparative analysis. Unlike
Buddhist theories of ‘no self’ the Stoics remain committed to a metaphysical self. However, I believe
that one could argue that the Stoic conception of self is not egocentric because, as the theory of
oikeiosis shows, the ‘self’ can include other individuals. Perhaps, then, the Stoic expansion of the self
is similar to deflationary accounts of the self in Buddhism. See Sorabji (2005) for an overview of both
traditions.

Comparative Philosophy 8.1 (2017)

GOERGER

53

4.
I will now argue that by examining how classical and contemporary Buddhists
surmount the same problem, we can identify similar practices in Stoic philosophy.
Buddhism, which shares with Stoicism the goal of universal moral concern, contains
practices designed to generate a universally loving state. In particular, I will focus on
mettā meditation. This form of meditation was developed within the Theravadān
tradition, but is now practiced by Buddhists aligned with several different schools.2
The purpose of the meditation is to develop in practitioners the form of universal love
required by Buddhist teachings.
In the Karaniya Mettā Sutta (2004), his “Hymn of Universal Love,” the Buddha
instructs his followers to cultivate mettā for all creatures of the earth. Mettā is a Pali
word most commonly translated as ‘loving-kindness.’ The word is also often
translated as ‘friendliness’, ‘benevolence’, or simply ‘love’. Central to the sense of
the word is a love that is entirely altruistic and not self-seeking (Harvey 2007;
Salzberg 1995). After describing the all-encompassing nature of this task, which will
not exclude,
weak or strong without exception,
long, large,
middling, short,
subtle, blatant,
seen & unseen,
near & far,
born & seeking birth (14-20)

the Buddha says that,
As a mother would risk her life
to protect her child, her only child,
so should one cultivate a limitless heart
with regard to all beings (26-29).

The wise person “who wants to break through to the state of peace (2),” and achieve
“sublime abiding (38)” must take on the task of cultivating mettā for all living beings.
Just as the Stoics recognized that the Greek mind is familiar with the ethicopolitical relationships that characterize a polis and argued for the expansion of those
relationships, the Buddha advocates a universal family in which a mother’s love is
extended to all beings. In both cases, the universal concern is not a new form of
concern for others—it is not unique in type—but is instead a form of concern with
2

My aim in this section is to discuss Buddhist practice as opposed to the beliefs and commitments of
Buddhists of any single school. While I draw from both classical and contemporary sources and
several traditions, the practice of mettā meditation is similar among these authors. Readers wanting a
better understanding of the differences between various traditions should see Harvey (2000).

Comparative Philosophy 8.1 (2017)

GOERGER

54

which most are familiar. This familiar relationship, both schools claim, must be
extended to strangers, foreigners, and the like; a relationship that is usually reserved
for a select few forms the foundation for the type of relationship that one should
expand to all others. Thus, while Stoicism and Buddhism appeal to different
foundational relationships, the structure of their practices is quite similar.
As with the Stoics, cultivating mettā for all beings requires practice rather than a
simple intellectual commitment. Mettā meditation is one practice which developed in
response to this need and guides the practitioner as she pursues a universally loving
state (c.f. Mills 2004). The process was codified in the fifth century CE by
Buddhaghosa, an important Theravadān commentator on the Pali canon, in his work
The Path to Purification (Buddhaghosa 1976). Buddhaghosa instructs the practitioner
to purify his or her mind of hostility before beginning to “break down the barriers by
practicing loving-kindness over and over again, accomplishing mental impartiality
towards the four persons, that is to say, himself, the dear person, the neutral person,
and the hostile person (IX.40).”
Mettā meditation is practiced today and contemporary Buddhist teachers3
generally describe the practice as follows: after achieving a state of meditative
awareness the practitioner visualizes someone whom she already loves. This is most
often the practitioner herself but can also be the practitioner’s mother.4 She then
repeats a mantra which bestows mettā upon the target person such as “May I be
happy. May I be safe from internal and external dangers.” She visualizes herself and
“repeat[s] these phrases over and over again, letting the feelings permeate [her] body
and mind (Kornfield 2002).” This meditation is practiced daily for several weeks.
When the practitioner feels that her bestowal of mettā upon herself is genuine and that
she really does wish happiness and safety unto herself, she begins the exercise again
visualizing a ‘benefactor,’ a person for whom she already feels love and kindness.
Traditionally, the benefactor is the practitioner’s teacher. Again, she repeats the
mantra and continues to do so for several weeks or months until her bestowal of mettā
is genuine. Slowly, one person at a time over the course of many years, the process is
continued. Next comes mettā toward friends, then community members, and then
strangers. Finally, one extends mettā toward one’s enemies. Throughout the
meditative practice, the practitioner works to extend a genuinely compassionate wish
to the target of her practice, only moving on when she feels that her mental states are
in line with the words she utters.
Successful mettā meditation requires one to analyze and consider the barriers to
mettā that need be broken if mettā is to be cultivated. It is easy to cultivate
3

Metta meditation is a popular topic in contemporary western Buddhism. For the sake of consistency,
my discussion here focuses mainly on the meditations described by American Theravadān Buddhist
teacher Jack Kornfield (2002, 117-120). Another source informing my discussion is the Dalai Lama’s
(2005) Tibetan text. Salzberg (2002) provides a more extensive overview of mettā and its role within
the Buddhist tradition.
4
Therevadā and Mahāyāna teachers of mettā meditation often differ in whom they recommend as the
first target person, with Therevadā often recommending the self and Mahāyāna often recommending
that one start with the mother. See Harvey 2000, 107-08.
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compassion and loving kindness toward those for whom one usually possesses a
loving state, but much harder as one moves to strangers and enemies. The exercise
forces one to understand the limitations one currently places on moral concern and to
expand one’s concern despite those limitations. One common strategy for cultivating
mettā toward those to whom one is negatively disposed is to imagine that person as a
child or as a parent (Dalai Lama 2005, 51-65). This procedure removes the focal
person from the context in which one normally encounters him and forces the
practitioner to view him as an entity capable of loving and being loved. The aim, only
rarely achieved after a lifetime of practice, is to possess the positive disposition
toward all living beings that a mother possesses toward her children.
The practice of mettā meditation is frequently engaged in for many years, with the
hope that one will develop a universally altruistic attitude. Empirical studies
demonstrate that the exercise is effective in just seven weeks. That is, individuals who
engage in mettā meditation even for a brief period of time do in fact become more
altruistic and compassionate (Fredrickson et. al. 2008). Empirical studies such as
these are important for two reasons. First, they show that meditative practices are
effective. Second, they show that such exercises bridge the gap between theory and
practice. The universally loving attitude expressed by the Buddha above can be
developed provided that the practitioner engages in exercises designed to bring that
state about.
5.
No extant evidence shows that the Stoics developed anything nearly as robust as
mettā meditation.5 However, I do believe that the Stoics utilized many of the same
techniques in order to develop universal moral concern. My aim in this section is
twofold. First, I will argue that the form of universal moral concern advocated by the
Stoics is quite similar to the form of universal love advocated by the Buddha. Second,
I will discuss the Circle of Hierocles in depth and outline two other passages which
articulate moral exercises and practices similar in form and content to mettā
meditation.
At first glance it may seem that Stoicism requires individuals to treat everyone
with complete impartiality, abandoning the superficial differences and roles (mother,
sister, cousin, etc.) that often influence our behavior toward others. Annas (1995, 262276) advocates this reading, trying to make sense of Stoic universal concern while at
the same time noting that the Greeks had no word for our modern notion of
impartiality. She argues that the theory of moral development produces a tension in
Stoic moral theory between partiality owed to particular persons and complete moral
impartiality. For example, the special and partial relationship one has with one’s
mother is “diluted” as one comes to treat mother, aunt, and stranger the same. This
5

While my discussion focuses mainly on the reconstruction of ancient Stoic practice, contemporary
Stoics have begun to construct similar exercises. See Stockdale (1993), Irvine (2008), and Holiday
(2016) for more information about the current movement to revitalize Stoicism.
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tension is well known even in contemporary ethics (Nagel 1986; Wolf 1992), and it is
not surprising that the Stoics encounter it as well.
Stoicism is a diverse school of thought and my remarks are limited to Stoics
writing in the late Greco-Roman period,6 but among those authors, I believe there is
ample textual evidence that speaks against the above reading (c.f. Sorabji 2000).
Epictetus, for example, places great importance on the roles individuals play. In
Discourse II.10, he asks students to “examine who [they] are,” before they act. The
student will find that “in the first place, [he is] a man, that is, a being in whom there is
nothing more sovereign that his power of choice…(II.10.1).” He then lists other roles
that the student may play: son, brother, city councilor, youth, old man, and so on. He
says, “Each of these names, if rightly considered, always points to the acts
appropriate to it.” Though many over-emphasize roles and titles and underemphasize
their common humanity, Epictetus does not argue that we should favor the human
role over all others. Instead, one must be a brother and a human being, a councilor
and a human being. He does not believe that universal moral concern is incompatible
with the formation of particular moral relationships.
Seneca places a similar emphasis on roles. He considers a case in which a young
man has been disinherited by his father. How should the young man act? As a son
would act, Seneca claims. Again we find a connection between appropriate action and
the roles one plays. The ‘human’ role is emphasized so frequently in Stoicism
because, living as sons and fathers, aunts and cousins, we forget to act as a human
being should act. Still, there is little evidence to suggest that the late Stoics believed
that universal moral concern required absolute impartiality. Instead, it seems to
require that one treat each person as our varied roles demand. To erode the moral
importance of being a son or to erase that role in favor of complete impartiality is
antithetical to the Stoic moral project.
The Stoics should be read as advocating an other-oriented concern similar to
familial love. Blundell (1990) argues that discussions of oikeiōsis in ancient texts
raise concerns similar to those that occur in discussions of familial love (philia), and
at some points she speaks of oikeiōsis in ways that suggest that the process expands
love. For instance, she says, “The other regarding face of oikeiōsis goes beyond this,
however, to embrace concern of the other for their own sake. That is, we should be
concerned for others…out of a disinterested concern for their well-being (222).”
Many philosophers have closely connected the possession of a disinterested concern
for well-being with loving another (e.g. Frankfurt 2004 and Helm 2010). Thus, while
oikeiōsis is a process by which one can expand moral concern and though the Stoics
never identified the expansion of love as the goal of this process, if the common
analysis of love is correct, then the Stoics were advocating the expansion of a
6

In this essay I focus on Stoicism as articulated by philosophers during the Roman period primarily
because these philosophers left behind a large number of extant writings. Further, it is generally argued
that late Stoic figures were more concerned with the practical implications of Stoicism than earlier
figures. It is not my intention to make a contribution to that debate here. Gill (2006) and Sorabji (2005)
both provide excellent discussions of how the late Stoics differed from their predecessors while
remaining committed to the Stoic philosophical project.
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disinterested, other-regarding concern similar to that articulated by Buddhism.
I will now turn to three passages in which Stoic philosophers articulate meditative
exercises similar to mettā meditation.
5.1
The 2nd century CE Stoic philosopher Hierocles, provides an image that helps to
illustrate the above points. He imagines each individual as circumscribed by many
concentric circles. At the center stands the agent. Surrounding him, in the first
concentric circle, are his parents and siblings. The second circle contains extended
family members, the third community members, and so on. As we move away from
the center of the circle our moral concern naturally decreases. Hierocles instructs us
to “draw the circles somehow towards the center, making all human beings more like
our fellow city dwellers, and so forth (Stobeaus, Flor. 84.23).” Many contemporary
philosophers have found Hierocles’ way of conceptualizing the cosmopolitan project
useful; philosophers as disparate as Martha Nussbaum (2002) and Peter Singer (2011)
have utilized his image in their work.
Hierocles next suggests an exercise that “would stimulate and intensify the
drawing in of the circles we have suggested.” What is his ‘treatment’ or ‘tonic’? He
instructs students to begin to call uncles and aunts “mothers” and “fathers,” to call
cousins “siblings”, and so forth. Presumably, this change in how one labels others is
an exercise or “psychological mechanism” intended to reshape one’s moral concern
(Annas 1995, 267; c.f. Sorabji 2000, 222). The passage describes a practice designed
to bring about the psychological state required by Stoic moral theory. One is to
literally label and think about one’s cousins as siblings in order to re-understand the
relationship one has with them. Over time, this change in label should result in a
change in moral concern as one becomes just as concerned for one’s cousins as one is
for one’s siblings. This process is repeated for relatives, community members, and
then strangers and foreigners as well.
The similarities between Hierocles’ Circle and mettā meditation are quite obvious.
As noted, in mettā mediation a frequent instruction when practicing with those toward
whom one finds it difficult to extend love is to imagine the target individual as a
child, a mother, etc. The point of this instruction is to upset one’s understanding of the
person and to see him in a different light, breaking down old identities and replacing
them with new ones. Hierocles suggests a similar practice, and the image of the
concentric circles suggests an exercise by which the practitioner implements changes
and makes progress. When Hierocles suggests that we call our friends ‘brother’ and
our aunts ‘mother,’ he is suggesting an exercise by which we might erode some of the
barriers to more expansive moral concern. The change in label is meant to bring about
a change in thinking which will, one hopes, reshape the direction and scope of one’s
moral concern.
I call this process, common among the Stoics, “re-identification.” An individual
for whom one does not experience moral concern is re-identified as an individual
toward whom normally does experience moral concern. The moral concern for the

Comparative Philosophy 8.1 (2017)

GOERGER

58

latter individual is then projected onto the former individual. In this case, cousins are
re-identified as siblings so that the concern one feels toward siblings can be extended
to cousins. The process is also found in mettā meditation wherein the love one
possesses for oneself is extended to close others, neutral persons, and enemies. In
both Buddhism and Stoicism teachers argue that by working to alter the way we think
about another, we can begin to reshape our concern for that person.
5.2
A less obvious example of re-identification is suggested in a famous passage by
Marcus Aurelius. He writes:
Say to thyself at daybreak: I shall come across the busy-body, the thankless, the
overbearing, the treacherous, the envious, the unneighborly. All this has befallen them
because they know not good from evil. But I . . . can neither be injured by them - for no
one can involve me in what is debasing - nor can I be angry with my kinsman and hate
him. For we have come into being for co-operation, as have the feet, the hands, the
eyelids, the rows of upper and lower teeth. To thwart one another is against nature; and
we do thwart one another by showing resentment and aversion. (Meditations II.1,
emphasis added)

Marcus makes two suggestions in this passage. First, we must remember that those
who annoy us are human beings and as such they are often misled as they choose
between good and evil. Few claims are stressed more often in late Stoic writings;
human beings make mistakes and often do so unintentionally. Second, he suggests
that we come to view those who bother us as essential parts of the whole. To hate
them and attempt to thwart them is to go against nature, for it is to disregard a part of
the human community. Our enemies are thus no longer viewed as enemies but as
misguided individuals with whom we must cooperate.
Marcus is advocating a philosophical exercise in this passage. While the passage
is not ordinarily linked to moral development in the late Stoa, it suggests that one
engage in a daily practice designed to reshape one’s perceptions of the individuals
that surround one. Given the emphasis on moral exercise in the late Stoics, Marcus’
exhortation to “Say to yourself at daybreak….” prescribes a mantra that should be
repeated daily. He believes that ordinary barriers between individuals can be broken
down through radical re-identification and the repetition of such mantras. The
passage, though perhaps not describing a ‘meditative’ practice at first glance, suggests
that one repeat mantras and re-label others in ways quite similar to the meditative
practices described in Section 4 above.
5.3
Seneca, a man obsessed with self-experimentation and practicing upon his own life,
gives similar advice to one who finds himself too high and mighty to dine with a
slave. He writes (in a bit of dialogue): “‘They are slaves,’ people declare. Nay, rather
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they are men. ‘Slaves!’ No, comrades. ‘Slaves!’ No, they are unpretentious friends.
‘Slaves!’ No, they are our fellow-slaves, if one reflects that Fortune has equal rights
over slaves and free men alike (Ep. Mor. 47).” Again we see a push toward reidentification—a stripping down of one identity in order to replace it with another.
The slave is a human being and as such deserves to be treated as a human being. He is
neither superior nor inferior to the Stoic practitioner, but simply plays a different role
in the cosmic drama. Each of us has our own masters, Seneca emphasizes, and is
enslaved in our own way.
These three passages, the second and third rarely read as recommending or
illustrating meditative exercises, each engage the Stoic student in a process similar to
mettā meditation. As already noted, I think it unlikely that the Stoics developed
meditative practices as complex or intense as those developed by Buddhist schools.
However, the late Stoics and many schools of Buddhism embrace a similar theoretical
commitment—the generation of universal moral concern—and placed great emphasis
on practical outcomes over intellectual achievement. It is thus reasonable, I think to
read these passages as recommending practical exercises to their readers. The
ongoing use of metaphor, mantras, and re-identification makes little sense otherwise;
absent a practical goal, the theoretical structure is not enriched by the representative
passages.
6.
I have argued that we can gain insight into Stoic moral practice by considering similar
practices in classical and contemporary Buddhist thought. It is frequently remarked
that Stoicism is as much a “way of life” as it is a philosophical system. Less
frequently, however, do we appreciate what this means for our interpretation and
analysis of a school of thought that was, in many ways, comparable to contemporary
lived religions. Stoic philosophy was not simply studied by ancient philosophers. One
would not call an individual who had spent decades studying Buddhism a Buddhist
unless she also practiced Buddhism. Her extensive knowledge is not sufficient to be a
practitioner of the religion (Keown 2013, 5-7). Similarly, Epictetus, Seneca, and
Marcus Aurelius self-identified as Stoics, as individuals who practiced Stoicism as
opposed to those who merely studied it. Thus, we must treat the ancient Stoics not
just as thinkers but also as practitioners, and we must read their writings not just to
understand their thinking, but also to understand the form of life they lived and
recommend.
When we examine the texts from this angle, we see a set of philosophers whose
work was based in experience as much as intellect. They sought to practice what they
preached and were not satisfied with argumentative quibbling. In this, Stoic thinkers
have a great deal in common with many Buddhist thinkers. I hope that the above
discussion demonstrates the need for more comparative work between Hellenism and
many schools of Asian thought, with a greater emphasis on the practices and forms of
life these figures advocate. A complete understanding of Stoicism requires an
understanding of what it meant to live as a Stoic, and those Asian religious traditions
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in which the line between theoretical philosophy and practical life is much thinner
provide excellent examples of how philosophical systems of this type function.
Of course, comparative work must be cautiously undertaken. Despite many
similarities, Stoicism and Buddhism are diverse systems in their own right which
developed on opposite sides of the globe over the course of many centuries. However,
while I have allowed insights from Buddhism to shape my interpretation of Stoicism,
I have grounded my claims about Stoicism in extant Stoic writings. My methodology
suggests that similar theoretical commitments, in this case commitments to universal
moral concern and to a lived philosophy, result in similar moral practices. I have
placed before the reader passages that support this view.
Further, I hope that by taking Stoic philosophers at face value, one comes to see
that they often have more in common with contemporary religious traditions than
with much of the Western philosophical tradition. Self-professed doctors of the soul,
these philosophers were not content with an understanding of the world and
humanity’s place within it (c.f. Nussbaum 1994). Instead, they sought to rescue their
students from the vagaries of the human condition. This practical goal separates the
late Stoics from figures, both ancient and modern, who view philosophy as a process
by which insight is gained and knowledge is accumulated and systematized. The
Hellenistic philosophers, particularly the Stoics, place a remarkable emphasis on the
life of the philosopher, and their work undermines any firm distinction between
theory and practice. To ignore this emphasis is to ignore much of what makes their
work unique.
At the same time, and this must be stressed, the Stoic philosophers are
philosophers in the Western tradition, and the pursuit of truth was central to their
understanding of philosophy. The late Stoics perhaps occupied one end of a spectrum,
placing less of an emphasis on the theoretical underpinnings of their theories and
more on their salvific mission (c.f. Gill 2006 and Sorabji 2005). In approaching these
texts, then, a balance must be struck between reading them as forwarding
philosophical theories – theories that are argued for and defended – and as forwarding
prescriptions for the treatment of philosophical disease.
The exploration of Stoic moral practice in this essay has been tied to observations
about practices in Buddhism, and my central focus has been on identifying passages
of text that recommend moral practices. I hope, however, that this essay can provoke
a greater interest in a different kind of comparative philosophy. Many comparative
studies today utilize Western philosophical sources to understand non-Western
sources. This work has been quite productive and has in many ways reshaped our
understanding of philosophy. Equally important, however, is to identify those
components of non-Western philosophical schools that can enrich and enhance our
understanding of Western philosophies. The work I present here is meant to be a
small step in that direction.
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